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supply nitrogen fertilizer to your pastures and fields,
and you sell your pigs and cows at auction when they
are fat. On family, or mixed, farms, the rearing and
selling oflivestock is the raison d'etre of the operation,
and the operation is, in the current jargon, sustainable,
ecologically balanced, and consistent with principles
of Christian stewardship.
Three initial confessions. I am not a farmer; my
theological convictions are informed as much by the
Reformed tradition as by the Anabaptist; and I am not
nearly as virtuous as William Hedgepeth's paean to hogsurrounded Iowans would lead you to believe. I know
something about the way mixed farms operate, and I
know something about the way Mennonites think. I
know, too, that Hedgepeth is right; there are eight times
as many pigs in my state as people. But, contrary to
what my mother thinks, I am not a moral virtuoso.
Neither am I interested in defending received traditions
about family farms, or sectarian theology, or the
supposed angelic effects of boars and sows on people.
I am interested in drawing on the wisdom invested in
the practice of family farming and the reasoning of
theologians and philosophers in order to answer this
question: Is it in God's will to raise and eat pigs?
In the conclusion to a book called Is There A Moral
Obligation to Save the Family Farm?, I argued in 1987
that mixed farms are the most politically viable
institution for meeting obligations concerning food

It is not by mere chance that Virtue ... dwells
in greatest proportions precisely upon that
same span of soil where hogs thrive in greatest
abundance. In Iowa, where people ... read the
Bible in the bathtub, there is approximately a
full litter of pigs ... for every single citizen.
William Hedgepeth!
Theological discussions can be abstract and hard to
apply, but I do not want this one to be. The reason is
that I want to convince you to adopt a specific stance
toward food animals. The best way for me to do this is
by telling you my story.
I am a Mennonite, and we, typically, are rural folk.
I do not know whether every other Christian sect or
denomination has more farmers per capita than we do,
but I would be surprised if Presbyterians or Catholics
had a higher ratio. Mennonites aspire to live simply
and peacefully, and those who farm try to farm in a
way that returns to the land as much as we take out of
the land. In Story County, Iowa, where I live, the
simplest and most sustainable way to farm is called
family farming, where you raise grains in summer and
feed them to livestock in winter. You use the manure to
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production, rural economies, and future generations. 2
The burden of proof is on those who think we should
get rid of family farms and replace them with large
industrial farms. My brother-in-law read the book and
then asked me what an ideal farm would look like. I
had no answer, and not only because I did not know
enough about the daily operation of farms. I did not
know what to say about the practice of raising and
slaughtering animals, the cornerstone of the family
farm's economy. I was sure that factory farms were not
the answer because it is clearly inhumane to confine
four chickens to floorless cages and to keep anemic
veal calves in narrow chutes. 3 But the question for me
went beyond "What constitutes humane care?" to "Is it
right to raise and slaughter animals?"
Several years after beginning to champion the
virtues of family farms, and a few months after
converting to the Mennonites, I became convinced by
philosophical arguments that eating meat is morally
wrong. This made for a dilemma. How can someone
who loves family farms reject the central practice on
which they are based? How can someone of my
Anabaptist and Reformed theological proclivities reject
the time-honored tradition of Christian stewardship in
which the domestication and humane use of animals is
not only permitted but encouraged? And yet, there I
was, newly convinced that domestic animals had at least
a primafacie right not to be killed and eaten at a young
age, but without a clue as to how to square this belief
with my theological and agricultural convictions. Did I
mean to say that the actions of generations of Mennonite
farmers in raising and slaughtering hogs were sinful?

emotions, desires, wishes, preferences, and a family life.
All of this seemed evident to me from watching the
pigs on my Uncle's farm. Reflecting on a pig's life will
probably convince you, too.
Consider: pigs are not, as common knowledge has it,
dirty, dumb, or solitary, animals. If given a sufficient
amount ofroom, pigs will invariably defecate in the same
area, teach their young to keep away from this area, and
establish the area at a considerable remove from the
sleeping area. Contrary to popular belief, pigs prefer to
wallow in clean water, not mud, and will not play with
toys soiled by feces. 4 Pigs are intelligent, affectionate,
and social animals. The only thing they seem to love more
than having their stomachs and ears rubbed is lying next
to their neighbors after having run playfully in circles
around them, squealing and barking all the while.
What is it like to be a pig? No one can get inside a
pig's mind, of course, but we can think carefully about
how they appear. Here is William Hedgepeth's
perspective on his day spent in a pig pasture:
Idling hogs amble and squat. Some root. One
sneezes. The sleeping hog beside me wags his
ear a twitch or two and otherwise remains
removed from the milieu. A Hampshire bites
a Yorkshire's ear. A Poland China bites my
foot. A white hog with a black face and black
spot on his side executes a galloping gleeful
leap into the vacant pond. A wandering rooter
pussyfoots up the hill and sneezes right into
the face of the one asleep, who responds
merely with another quick ear-wag and
continues his snooze (p. 125).

I. How I Became a Vegetarian
'" A hog [taking a] siesta on the hilltop has
just jumped up to bump an intruding rooter
down the slope, somersaulting to the bottom
with a tumbling eruption of high-pitched
squeals. Most of the hogs are up now,
moseying about, perfectly unhurried: gambol
and squat awhile, browse in the dried mud,
drift in bulky serenity among the stumps and
stubble and birds, call a sudden halt to it all
every so often to look up at a sound or nudge
another in the loin. Probe, poke, trot, root. Ah,
hogs! They have unquenchably inquiring
minds, each with a vast capacity for sustained
wonder. And such a beatific quality-a certain
handsomeness, really (p. 128).

I have told you that philosophical, not theological,
arguments convinced me to abandon meat-eating.
Abandoning it was not an easy thing to do because meateating is not an abstract philosophical issue. You cannot
just make up your mind to oppose meat-eating the way
you might make up your mind to oppose apartheid. If
you make up your mind on this subject, you cannot
really defer acting on your resolution until the next
faculty meeting. You have to decide, before your
stomach growls-probably within the next four hours,
whether you are going to act on your new belief. The
concreteness of the issue was a barrier for me.
I did not have a hard time deciding whether pigs
experience pleasure and pain, or whether they have
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a future existence. Do pigs? According to R. G. Frey's
analysis, an animal has to be able to possess concepts
in order to have interests in the relevant sense, because
without concepts the animal cannot represent its
interests to itself. If the animal cannot represent its
interests to itself, it cannot take an interest in anything.
To have concepts, the animal must possess language,
because that is the medium in which beings frame
concepts. Here the argument reaches rock bottom, and
I found myself asking, Do pigs possess language?
We, I reasoned, surely "possess language," although
I knew that talking about our mental life in this way
committed me to a specific psychological paradigm,
the paradigm philosophers call the belief and desire
framework. To interpret ourselves in terms of beliefs
and desires is not the only way to explain what goes on
inside, but it is a powerful and well-developed way,
and it coheres with the picture we typically use to think
about ourselves. So I was prepared, and am still
prepared, to accept the belief and desire schema.
Humans have both beliefs and desires. We have
already established that some higher marnmals-pigshave, at least, desires. When my Uncle's barrows and
gilts lift the lids on their feeder bins, I see no simpler or
more efficient way of interpreting their behavior tllan
to say that they desire to eat. When Hedgepeth's piglets
chase each other around the pasture, there is no better
explanation than, the pigs want to play. The central
question is not whether pigs have desires, but whether
they have beliefs. If they believe that there is food under
the lid, or that by hiding behind the tire they will surprise
their buddy, then they must possess language and
concepts, because beliefs are made of language and
concepts. If they have beliefs, they may be capable of
taking an interest in their eating and playing. And if
they can take an interest in those things, they may have
a moral right to food, freedom, and a future.
Frey is convinced, however, that animals do not have
language because, he asserts, they are not capable of
making assertions or lying. If Frey is right that animals
do not have language, then animals cannot have
concepts, beliefs, or interests in the sense required for
having moral rights. If animals cannot take an interest
in their future, they cannot have a right to that future. It
follows, according to Frey, that painless slaughter does
not violate a pig's right to continued existence because
pigs have no moral rights.
This line of argument, if sound, would constitute a
powerful philosophical justification for the historical

Aristotle believed each animal has a telos or purpose
to which it is directed, a "that for the sake of which" it
exists. If Hedgepeth is right, the telos of a hog is the
will to root, to find his food at least three inches underground, and to get his snout into every tractor tire, hole,
and crevice within reach. Not forgetting sleeping and
investigating and eating and mating and playing, rooting
must be one thing for the sake of which God made hogs.
The daily activities of hogs clearly suggest that they
possess desires, preferences, pleasures, pains, and social
lives. You may also now have some idea of what the
telos of this higher marnmal may be. The hog: Kingdom,
Animalia; Phylum, Chordata; Class, Mammalia; Order,
Artiodactyla; Family, Suidae; Genus, Sus; Species, Sus
scrofa; Subspecies: S.s. scrofa (the Central European
wild boar), S.s. leucomystax (Japanese wild boar), S.s.
vittatus (Southeast Asian pig), and S.s. domestica
(domestic). These are some of the facts about hogs, but
facts alone, no matter how many, would never add up
to the moral judgment that it is wrong to kill and eat
Sus scrofa domestica. For that, we need a general moral
principle or two.
Here's one: It is wrong to deprive a being of its right
to life. When I first started thinking seriously about the
one and a quarter inch thick Iowa chops I so loved to
barbecue, I thought I had to decide whether pigs had
rights, and whether I was depriving them of that most
basic right, the right to life, by paying other people to
carve them up for me. I was impressed by arguments
like Joel Feinberg's and Michael Tooley's that it is
impossible for an entity to have a right to life unless
that entity has interests in the sense of "able to have an
interest in X."5 Clearly, it is in the pig's interest to be
able to sleep, eat, and root. But this is a different, weaker,
sense of "interest" than the one required. For there are
things that have interests that cannot take an interest in
anything. It is in a hay baler's interest to be kept full of
baling twine, but the machine does not possess the
conscious .awareness necessary to take an interest in
seeing that it does not run out of twine in the middle of
a row. Having things that are in its interest, and even
having things that are good for it, does not make a hay
baler a bearer of moral rights. The machine does not
have the right to be well maintained
In order to have moral rights, something must be
conscious, capable oftaking an interest or able to have
an interest in what is good for it. We are capable of
taking an interest in food, freedom, and the future, and
we each have a basic moral right to food, freedom, and

Summer 1992

123

Between the Species

Pigs and Piety: Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals

wrong for reasons other than that they violate rights."?
And as another adds, "we may have duties to entities
which don't have rights."g
To think there is a single simple criterion according
to which we may decide whether we are justified in
killing a being is to think in excessively constricted
terms. And to think that "the way is open" to killing
any being that lacks moral rights is to think in terms of
an unacceptable conceptual paradigm.9 I decided I had
to rethink my approach, and fast.

Mennonite practice of domesticating and eating pigs,
and would buttress theological positions emphasizing
ecological hannony and stewardship of nature. But do
pigs lack language? They may not have the ability to
make or entertain declarative sentences, Frey's way of
interpreting what it means to be capable of language.
But it seems to me that pigs communicate with each
other, and they can, if they so desire, communicate with
us in certain limited but distinctive ways.6 Pigs, moreover,
appear to many observers to reflect in a self-conscious
way about their environment. Some, including me, think
they have seen pigs trying to deceive each other. Pigs
may indeed possess language, and may have the
conceptual ability to take an interest in their future. But
if they can take an interest in their future existence,
they may have a moral right to that future. And if they
do, our killing them violates their most basic right.
If my factual claims about pigs' lives are correct,
and if the moral principle, that it is wrong to deprive a
being of its right to life is true, and if I have made no
mistakes in reasoning to the conclusion, then it may be
wrong to deprive a pig of its right to life. So I reasoned
for several months.

3. A Theocentric Perspective
There I was, converted to the view I should not eat
higher mammals but no longer persuaded by the
arguments that had brought me to that point. I wanted a
more substantial and holistic grounding for my
conclusions, so I returned to my teacher, James
Gustafson, for his theocentric perspective.
Gustafson argues that ethics as traditionally
construed is excessively anthropocentric in that it
concentrates only on what is good for the human
species. Gustafson wants those in religious traditions,
at least, to take into account the wider patterns of
God's governance and care for all of Creation, and he
urges his reader to search for rules cohering with the
natural relations of all things. Adapting a command from
Paul's letter to the Romans, Gustafson summarizes his
approach this way:

2. The Problem with Animal Rights Talk
According to this line of reasoning, pigs have the
right to life because they have beliefs and can take an
interest in their future. But what about beings without
beliefs who cannot take an interest in their future? What
about fetuses, very young infants, and adults in
irreversibly comatose states? Lacking beliefs, language,
and the ability to take an interest in their future, socalled marginal human beings also lack the equipment
necessary to have a right to life. But do we really want
to say that, that newborn babies do not have a right to
life because, as Tooley puts it, they do not "possess any
concept of a continuing self'? Tooley candidly, if sanewhat
coolly, admits this line of thought leads to the conclusion
that it is not morally wrong to kill young infants.
Any chain of reasoning ending with that conclu~ion
must be mistaken. I began to see that trying to think
about morality solely in terms of rights leads to
counterintuitive results. And I was soon convinced that
the consequences of thinking about which beings we
may and may not justifiably kill solely in the language
of individual rights is itself a reductio of such a narrow
approach. As one philosopher has pointed out, "we have
to take seriously the possibility... that some actions are
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Be enlarged in your vision and affections, so
that you might better discern what the divine
governance enables and requires you to be and
to do, what are your appropriate relations to
God, indeed what are the appropriate relations
of all things to God.I°
If we relate to all things in ways that show respect
for the relations of all things, will we eat meat? Let us
agree to judge our practices by the criterion of whether
a practice fits with the natural relationships of plants,
animals, and humans, as these relationships can be
discerned from the study of science, philosophy, and
theology. Suppose, further, that "Man, the measurer,
can no longer be the measure of the value of all things,"
and that, instead, "all things" are now the measure of
us. May farmers continue to buy and sell feeder hogs?
Gustafson himself seems to have little interest in
this question, and offers no guidance. To figure out what
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the cow, chewing her cud; and the sheep, woolly and
white. Over here is the donkey, shaggy and brown.
Jesus Christ comes to earth in human form, and we
witness and rejoice at his birth. But he was born not in
one ofour houses, but in an animal shed. It is not insignificant that animals witnessed and rejoiced at his birth. For
God put animals around the manger just as God put them
at the scene of every major event in salvation history.
Think of the scene at the Garden of Eden. Before God
made women and men and boys and girls, God made
cows and donkeys and dogs and sheep. Think of God's
first words to humans. When God first laid down the law
for how we are to treat each other, God did not overlook
our relations to animals, making a point of instructing us
only to eat plants. Originally, we were vegetarians, and
God did not want us to raise and slaughter animals. As
the author of Genesis 1:29-30 puts it,

a theocentric perspective on food animals might be,
then, I turned to Scripture. You will not be surprised to
learn that I found a thoroughly ambiguous answer. The
Bible implies here that God wants lions and lambs to
lie down together in peace; in the first chapter of Genesis
we are told that God gave us only plants and fruits for
food. ll Yet the Bible implies elsewhere, in passage after
passage, that it is alright to be carnivores. After the Fall,
God explicitly issues permission for us to eat animals.
How can a Mennonite reconcile these biblical
permissions to eat meat with moral vegetarianism?

God also said, "I give you all plants that bear seed
everywhere on earth, and every tree bearing
fruit which yields seed: they shall be yours for
food. All green plants I give for food to the
wild animals, to all the birds of heaven, and to
all reptiles on earth, every living creature."

And think of the scene at the future New Creation.
The biblical story begins with humans as vegetarians,
and it ends that way, too. When the Lord comes in power,
when the poor are judged with justice and the knowledge
of the Lord fills the land, then, we are told by Isaiah,
the wolf shall live with the sheep,
and the leopard lie down with the kid;
and the calf and the young lion shall grow up
together,
and a little child shall lead them;
and the cow and the bear shall be friends,
and their young shall lie down together.

An Interlude: Christmas Meditation

As I think about the Bible and animals toward the
end of 1990, Christmas approaches, and I am reminded
of my earliest memories of Christmas..
There is my mother's manger scene: the stable made
of wood; the angel hung from the peak; baby Jesus
wrapped in swaddling clothes and lying in the manger.
There is Mary, hovering over the infant, attentive to his
slightest movement, and there, a step behind her, is
Joseph, the wise men, and the shepherds.
I could end my description there, but I would have
skipped the animals, of course. For there, behind the
holy baby and the Virgin and in front of the shepherds,
are the wise men's camels, looking gangly and out of
place; the shepherds' dogs, asleep at their masters' feet;
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One day, all animals will stop doing harm to each other,
and "the lion shall eat straw like cattle."And if the
"infant shall play over the hole of the cobra," what
excuse will we have for killing cobras, or lions, or cattle?
For on that day, no living thing will "hurt or destroy in
all my holy mountain" (Isaiah 11:5-9).
Or think of the stories Jesus liked to tell. If the
number of times someone refers to lambs and sheep
and goats and vipers and asses is any indication of their
affection for animals, then our Lord must have loved
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meat-eating, and all support economies founded on the
domestication, slaughter, and consumption of animals.
And yet, there by Jesus' crib, are the animals. Are
they there only to serve us? Well, they do serve us, and
some have said we have rigorous covenants to keep
with them because they serve us. We have a covenant
with the donkey, it is said: You carry the mother of our
Lord, and we will care for your every need. We have a
covenant with the dog, it is said: You provide us
companionship, and we will give you exercise. And we
have a covenant with the horse, it is said: You pull our
plow, and we will give you a warm stall and oats. We
signed different terms with sheep, cows, turkeys,
chicken, fish, and hogs: They serve us by dying for us
at a premature age. For modem breeds of hogs, whose
life expectancy might conservatively be put at ten years,
the contract runs out at six months. Of course, we
provide them with plenty of food and water while they
are with us. But they pay, early, with their lives.
Are these fair contracts?
The Bible indisputably approves of them. The authors
of Scripture recognize the intrinsic value of animals in
the original and final creations but, in the meantime, in
the between times, God seems to have made a concession
to our sinful condition by relaxing the law against the
eating of animal flesh. For hard after describing the
Garden of Eden, the author of Genesis describes the
post-Fallen world as one in which the animals are "meat
for us," and in which we are to rule over, have dominion
over, all forms of plant and animal life.
What aboutJesus? Even though animals often serve
as examples in his parables, he said nothing to our
knowledge about vegetarianism. There are no recorded
instances of him eating red meat in the New Testament,
but it seems reasonable to suppose, given the
Mediterranean culture of his time, that he ate fish. And
he said nothing about restoring the original herbivorous
condition of the original and final creation. So I must
ask again: In the face of the strong biblical permission
to raise and slaughter animals for food, can a Mennonite
argue for moral vegetarianism if he takes the Bible and
its tradition of interpretation seriously?
This is a difficult question for me. My tentative
answer has two parts. The first part is that vegetarianism
is not required for all people at all times. When the eating
of meat is the only way to sustain human life, then I
believe it is permissible to do so. The Bible was written
by largely nomadic or pastoral peoples who may not
have been able to flourish withoul raising the flocks of

nonhumans as much as St. Francis ofAssisi loved them.
Jesus' parables are full of animals. So, pick any major
biblical scene, and you will find animals there. The
menagerie at the manger scene is not a biblical anomaly.
Why all the biblical concern with animals? Because,
in the words of my mother's favorite hymn, God's eye
is on the sparrow. In the very first covenant God makes
with us after God has destroyed the world in the flood,
God makes an agreement with Noah and his family that
includes animals in it. The covenant is not, as we
ordinarily think of it, between the Deity and humankind
but, rather, between the Deity and all of creation, human
and animals included. Genesis 9:13 renders it like this:
My bow I set in the cloud,
sign of the covenant
between myself and the earth.
And five times in the ninth chapter of Genesis God promises
never again to destroy creation; the promise includes
humans, but it extends to "every living creature that is with
you, all birds and cattle, all the wild animals with you on
earth, all that have come out of tile ark" (Genesis 9:8-10).
If the biblical story begins and ends with humans as
vegetarians, why do most Christians, unlike Brahmins,
adherents of the Jain religion, and many Buddhists, eat
meat? The reason is that we believe God gave us
permission to do so. When and where? At the same
time God made the covenant with Noah. God tells Noah
to "be fruitful and increase, swarm throughout the earth
and rule over it" (Gen. 9:7), adding
The fear and dread of you shall fall upon all
wild animals on earth, on all birds of heaven,
on everything that moves upon the ground and
all fish in the sea; they are given into your
hands. Every creature that lives and moves
shall be food for you; I give you them all, as
once I gave you all green plants (Gen. 9:2-3).
This is the divine permission on which the nomadic
and agrarian economies of the West are based. To me,
the passage reads more as a grim prediction of what
will happen or, perhaps, as an unavoidable curse God
lays, grudgingly, on the world. It does not read to me as
God's preferred norm. Be that as it may, there are plenty
of other passages recording God's commands to
sacrifice animals. The world's three major Western
religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all condone
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Bible's moral protection. To argue this point effectively

sheep that appear throughout the Bible. So, on the one
hand, the Bible may originally have been addressed to
an audience in which a limited diet of animal flesh was
required for existence. Notice, however, what does not
follow from this concession. It does not follow that
affluent Americans in the 20th century may eat meat.
We can easily have our need for protein met in ways
other than eating pork chops and hamburgers.
The second part of my reply to the Bible's explicit
permission of meat-eating is this. While the Bible does
address many sins, it does not address all sins. For
example, the Bible does not explicitly call discrimination on the basis of age or sex a sin. Nor does it call
slavery a sin. Jesus said nothing about the practice of
buying and selling people with skins darker than ours.
Are we to conclude that God would have us continue
to own slaves, or that Jesus Christ, the Savior and
Liberator of all people, would not disapprove of our
beginning once more to conduct slave raids on poor
developing countries? Even though the Bible says
nothing that could be taken as a direct condemnation
of slavery, slavery is still wrong. The reason is because
the overall themes of the Bible are freedom, liberation,
justice, and mercy. The nineteenth century American
Methodists and Quakers who led the abolitionist
movement knew this. Even though Christian slave
owners in the nineteenth century could point to a
multitude of specific biblical passages that implicitly
permit slave-holding, the abolitionists had the stronger
argument, and we now acknowledge their point of view
as most in keeping with the whole biblical narrative.
I have come to interpret the Bible's views on the
killing of animals in the way I interpret its views on tile
owning of slaves. Even though each practice is
implicitly, if not explicitly, condoned, the practice is
still shown to be wrong by the larger story of salvation
in Jesus Christ. How could the biblical authors have
been so wrong on this point of morality? I do not believe
they were wrong on a point of morality. I believe they
were wrong on point of fact. Regarding slave-holding,
they were wrong to think that darker skinned humans
were not conscious, rational individuals. Once this
perception of the facts was corrected, darker skinned
humans could no longer be thought to fall outside tile
Bible's moral protection.
Analogously, the biblical authors were wrong about
mammals. They thought animals were not conscious,
sentient individuals. Once this misperception is
changed, nonhuman animals no longer fall outside tile
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would require me to say why I think animals are
conscious and sentient beings. That involves the
philosophical argument I made earlier that turns on the
claim that mammals aged one year and older have beliefs,
desires, emotions, social and family lives, and interests
in the strong sense of "able to take an interest in"
something. Having that, they are entitled to basic moral
rights, including the right to life. To my mind, Tom
Regan makes this argument persuasively.12
Just as early abolitionists had to fight both the wider
slave society and the power of slave-owning Christians
who rested their case on a selective reading of Scripture,
so Christian defenders of animals must fight both the
wider meat-eating society and the power of carnivorous
Christians who rest their case on a selective reading of
Scripture. No easy chore. I find encouragement in the
scene around the manger. There we see a picture of
creation in the peaceful coexistence God originally
intended and fmally wants. Around the manger we see
the truth of God's admission that God "desires steadfast
love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than
burnt offerings" (Hosea 6:6). And we see what it means
for God to have shown us what is good. God shows us
in the manger scene that what the Lord requires of us is
"to do justice, and to love kindness and [to] walk humbly
with [our] God" (Micah 6:8).
Scripture gives an ambiguous answer to the animal
question. As I mentioned previously, the text implies
here that God wants lions and lambs to lie down
together, while it states explicitly, elsewhere, tllat all
animals are to be food for us. I concluded, in my joumey,
that I could no more convince myself to be a vegetarian
on the basis of the Bible alone than I could convince
myself to be a vegetarian on the basis of rights talk alone.
I did not find clearer advice when I tumed to otller
religious traditions. Consider Hinduism, in which
Brahmins revere all animals, practice vegetarianism,
and adhere to the doctrine of ahimsa, noninjury. Like
Albert Schweitzer and the Jains, Brahmins in principle
will not even swat a gnat. Around the comer, however,
lower castes behead a goat in pious sacrifice to the
goddess Kali. Within Hinduism there is no consensus
about tile propriety of universal abstention from meat.
Consider Native American traditions, where you find
ambiguous attitudes. There is an attitude of respect for
tile buffalo's power and immensity, and warriors pause
to pray to tile beast, imploring it to lend them its noble
spirit. But then they proceed to slaughter it, eat it, and
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may see how protective Taylor is of wildlife. His attitude
toward domestic animals is less than clear, however.
The reason is that Taylor is impressed by the fact that
pets and food animals have been purposefUlly bred to
serve a human purpose. Unlike wild animals whose
existence does not depend on their fulfilling our needs,
domestic animals exist only because we have exercised
dominance over them and their environment. Taylor
puts the matter forcefully:

wear its skin. Surely it is better to use all of the animal
if you are going to kill it, but wouldn't it be still better
to eatjust com and beans and squash and to wear cotton?
I have not, in short, found unambiguous guidance
about how God would have us relate in a natural way
to domestic pigs, from Gustafson, from Scripture, from
Christian theology, or from the world's religions. Every
argument that the Christian tradition should be read as
sanctioning humane treatment and slaughter of food
animals, may be met by one that the tradition should
really be read as pointing proleptically toward
vegetarianism. So, even if my theologian colleagues
will not forgive me, they may at least understand why I
turned back at this point to my philosophical colleagues.

[The practice ofrearing food animals depends,
first,] on total hmnan dominance over nonhuman
living things and their environment. Second,
[it involves] treating nonhuman living things
as means to hmnan ends ... The social institutions
and practices of the bioculture are, frrst and
foremost, exercises of absolute, unconditioned
power. They are examples of the way humans
"conquer" and "subdue" nature. (The conquest
of nature has often been seen as a key to the
progress of civilization.) When we humans
create the bioculture and engage in its practices
we enter upon a special relationship with
animals and plants. We hold them completely
within our power. They must serve us or be
destroyed. For some practices their being
killed by us is the very thing necessary to
further our ends. Instances are slaughtering
animals for food, cutting timber for lumber,
and causing laboratory animals to die by giving
them lethal dosages of toxic chemicals. I?

4. An Environmental Theory of Respect for Nature
Gustafson insists that correct actions flow more from
the possession of proper affections than from the
following of proper rules. Paul Taylor believes that
character is the heart of ethics, too, and I read his
philosophical theory of respect for nature as a
complement to, and development of, certain aspects of
Gustafson's theology. Taylor makes the attitude of
respect for nature the basis of all moral reflection about
the environment, and identifies four dimensions of that
attitude. Two of them are relevant here. The first is the
valuational dimension, "the disposition to regard all
wild living things in the Earth's natural ecosystems as
possessing inherent worth."13 The second is the affective
dimension, "the disposition .. .to feel pleased about any
occurrence that is expected to maintain in existence the
Earth's wild communities of life, their constituent
species-populations, or their individual members."14
Taylor believes we owe the attitude ofrespect toward
wild living things. He avoids the language of animal
rights, but he insists we follow the principles of
proportionality and minimmn wrong. The frrst principle
means that we should never act disproportionately, for
example, violating an elephant's basic interest in life
simply to satisfy our nonbasic interest in having ivory
carvings on our mantlepiece. "Greater weight is to be
given to basic than to nonbasic interests, no matter what
species, human or other, the competing claims arise
from. Nonbasic interests are prohibited from overriding
basic interests."15 The second principle states that "the
actions ofhurnans must be such that no alternative ways
of achieving their ends would produce fewer wrongs to
wild living things."16 From these two principles you

Between the Species

Taylor does not explicitly draw the conclusion that it is
morally permissible to continue to subdue nature in this
way, but that conclusion is implied by his remarks. Other
environmental philosophers, such as J. Baird Callicott
and Mary Midgley, have a similarly bifurcated attitude
toward animals. 18 They think wild animals should be
left alone whereas domestic animals should be treated
hmnanely-that is, maintained in good health until they
are to be killed painlessly.
It began to look as if my tum to environmental
philosophy and the theocentric perspective might cause
me to overturn my decision against meat-eating. If there
is an absolute difference between wild and domestic
animals, and if this difference means that wild animals
have intrinsic value while domestic animals have only
instrumental value for humans, then it might be
permissible to raise and slay hogs and yet impermissible
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stable homosexual relationships. Their behavior toward
young piglets is hard to observe for reasons noted above.
There are, in sum, significant differences between
the physical, psychological, and social characteristics
of domestic and wild pigs. Wild pigs tend to be smaller,
fattier, more romantic, less promiscuous, and more
ferocious. Domestic pigs tend to be larger, leaner, less
romantic, eager to mate in season or out of season, and
more docile. The differences stem from the influence
of human intervention as farmers have consciously
selected individual pigs for the traits now possessed by
sows and boars. Breeders have weakened the pig's
natural defenses, and rendered them dumber, less agile,
and more meaty, than their wild relatives. Differences
are undeniable. And yet we may ask, how great are the
similarities? Are the differences significant enough to
justify claims that we have exercised "absolute power"
over the domestic animals?
The differences in physical appearance of African
bush pigs and Duroc hogs are noticeable, but both look
more like the other than they look like other species.
Both adapt quickly to changed environmental conditions.
Both exhibit tremendous behavioral plasticity in the face
of fluctuations in weather, diet, and physical threats.
Both exhibit attitudes of defiance, pride, and affection.
Both are extremely social. Both prefer not to leave the
company of others, except for the case of older males,
who sometimes prefer occasional solitude. Both like to
root in soil and water, to wallow in pools. Both exhibit
distinctive territorial behavior, keep separate areas for
elimination of urine and feces, and train their young to
do the same. Both are curious about new objects, and
will sniff and nibble any protrusion or hole. Both have
a complex range of vocal snorts and whoofs for
communicating a variety of emotions, signals, and
alarms. Both have nearly identical olfactory and
auditory capacities. Neither is able to regulate body
temperature for at least two days after birth. Neither is
receptive to newcomers to the herd. Both are gregarious
animals, huddling together against cold weather and
enjoying warm weather in close proximity.
The list could go on, but I have made the point. The
differences between domestic and wild pigs pale in light
of their similarities. May we then continue to believe
that we have exercised "unconditioned" power over the
being of the production hog? The scientific evidence
fails to support the claim because the identity of the
production hog is as much a product of natural forces
as it is of human intervention.

to kill wild wart hogs. To decide whether the difference
between tamed and untamed was really this decisive, I
had to read some animal science. Just how different are
Minnesota Number Threes from wild boars?
I immediately ran into a problem. To my knowledge,
there are no scientific studies comparing the physical
or behavioral traits of specific domestic pigs with wild
pigS. 19 Nonetheless, on the basis of certain generalizations scientists have proffered in the literature on
swine production, some observations about the
difference can be offered tentatively.2o Feral swine tend
to have aggressive dispositions. They often live in herds
of four to twenty foraging animals consisting of one to
four females and their young. Wild boars range freely
in forest settings throughout the year, staying close to
the herd during the reproductive season, when they
become territorial and protective. Omnivorous and
voracious eaters, sows and boars alike spend the
majority of their waking hours walking, rooting, and
eating. The courtship of an oestrus female by a wild
boar lasts several days, with the male grunting a soft
rhythmic mating song and having to overcome a last
minute rebuttal from her when she wheels and faces
him just before he tries to mount her. The wild sow
may spend days making a nest for her young. The boar
seems to enjoy the presence of piglets, tolerating them
as they wiggle on top of him as he rests.
Domestic swine tend to be larger, less fatty, more
docile toward humans and less agonistic toward each
other. As you might guess, we have little information
about how large a "domestic herd" might be because
pigs in confinement are not allowed to form natural
social groups. Boars are kept away from the sows, feeder
pigs are thrown together according to age, and sows
are kept in maternity pens before parturition and during
nursing. Even though they are usually denied the space
and freedom to form natural relations with other pigs,
domestic pigs are still known to adapt rapidly to new
conditions. They exhibit a high degree of intelligence
and have, for example, been trained to hunt truffles and
indicate targets like Pointer dogs.
The sexual relationships of confined pigs are
noticeably different from their wild counterparts. When
a sow in heat is presented to a boar, copulation occurs
quickly. There is very little behavior corresponding to
the long courtship of wild sows and boars, as domestic
sows usually allow boars to mount immediately, and
boars are selected, in part, for their virility and promiscuity. Boars kept away from sows sometimes form
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May we at least claim responsibility for the
distinctive features for which we have selected in our
hogs? For example, domestic pigs are diurnal creatures,
whereas wild pigs sleep during the day and are active
at night. Is this trait a human mark stamped on the pig?
It may be, just as the sexual promiscuity, docility, and
physical size of the domestic hog may be marks of
human intervention. Still, we must ask whether these
traits are really of our doing or whether they are not
responses that may be equally attributed to the hog.
Consider that domestic hogs tend to be diurnal creatures
whereas wild hogs tend to be nocturnal (hunting is easier
in the evening hours.) Did humans cause this difference?
I doubt it. Hogs are highly adaptable creatures, and there
is not much stimulation in hog pens at night The
domestic hog's preference for daylight activity may be
a tribute to its own plasticity of behavior, a trait caused
as much by the pig's own initiative as by the breeder's
selections. Being diurnal, in short, may be a learned
response to environmental conditions, and it may be a
characteristic pigs would abandon if turned out of their
pens or if stimulated at night This suggests that certain
behavioral differences betWeen domestic and wild species
may not only not be permanent but may be reversible.21
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Based on a review of the empirical differences
between undomesticated and domesticated hogs,
Taylor's claim that we have created these animals seems
weak, as does the implication that they are human
artifacts we may regard the way we regard tools.22 There
is no question that today's breeds are expressions of
human power and control over nature, the result of
invasive, repeated, and sustained manipulations of generations of animals. The Durocs and Hampshires and
Yorkshires now on Mennonite family farms would almost
certainly not be here were it not for humans. Hogs are
part of our moral community in a way wild animals
never have been because their evolution is intricately
connected with our own. They depend on us for their
existence. But it does not follow that we are justified in
continuing to intervene in their histories by encouraging
them to inbreed, and by slaughtering their young.
If Taylor's views about food animals are not entirely
clear, other environmental philosophers' views are clear.
Midgley and Callicott seem to condone meat-eating as
part of the long history of relations between humans
and domesticated animals. The view gains credence in
light of the fact that the history of a being is relevant to
deciding what that being is and what our natural duties
are toward it Consider Midgley's view. She approaches
ethics from a biosocial perspective, and points out that
we are members of nested communities, each of which
has a different structure. According to our various roles
in the various communities, we have various duties.
The central community for many of us is an immediate
family. We have duties not only to feed, clothe, and
shelter our children, but to bestow affection on them.
Bestowing similar affection on our neighbors' children
is not similarly required of us, however. Not only is it
not our duty, but "it would be considered anything from
odd to criminal were [we} to behave [toward neighborhood children the way we behave toward our own]."
At the next level, we have "obligations to [our]
neighbors which [we] do not have to less proximate
fellow citizens"-to watch their houses while they are
on vacation, for example, or to go to the grocery [or
them when they are sick or disabled. We have
obligations to those in our state which we do not have
toward human beings in general, and we have
"obligations to human beings in general which [we] do
not have toward animals in general."23
These subtly shaded social-moral relationships are
complex and overlapping. Thinking of animals,
Midgley argues that pet,> arc surrogate family members
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Having answered Callicott's challenge, I went back
to Taylor's rigid differentiation between the respect
owed wild animals and his quasi-instrumentalist view
of domestic animals. I discovered on second reading
that Taylor is more insistent on vegetarianism than I
had thought at first, "even though," he writes, "plants
and animals are regarded as having the same inherent
worth." 25 The principle of fairness, captured in the
metaphor of sharing the earth, draws attention to "the
amount of arable land needed for raising grain and other
plants as food for those animals that are in turn to be
eaten by humans when compared with the amount of
land needed for raising grain and other plants for direct
human consumption.... In order to produce one pound
of protein for human consumption, a steer must be fed
21 pounds of protein ... [a pig must be fed] 8.3
pounds... [and a chicken] 5.5 pounds.,,26 The land now
in cultivation to grow grains for cows and pigs could
be returned to wildlife refuge.
Taylor argues for vegetarianism by pointing out tllat
humans have taken over much more than their fair share
of the globe. To return land to wild animals we should
cultivate less ground, shrink our farms' size, and
probably concentrate them in one location so as to leave
large tracts of wilderness. His reasoning seemed sound
to me then, as it does now. And that is where I have
come to rest, for the moment. There are good reasons,
of an environmentalist and theocentric sort, for opposing
the eating of meat.
I still had two questions; Would it be wrong, if we
pulled in our plows and chemical sprays and shared the
earth equitably with other species, to eat an occasional
future pig raised on one of the small nonfactory farms?
And if in that ideal world some of us revert to hunting
and gathering as a permanent lifestyle, would it be wrong
for us to kill and eat one of the millions of wild pigs?
To answer this question, I went back to Taylor's five
priority principles. When the requirements of human
ethics compete with those of environmental ethics,
Taylor tells us to follow principles exhibiting the attitude
of respect for nature. The fundamental criterion is
fairness, read as species-impartiality. According to
Taylor, both plants and animals deserve respect, even
though neither one is a primary moral rights-holder. The
first priority principle is the principle of self-defense.

and merit treatment not owed either to less intimately
related animals, for example, to barnyard animals, or
to less intimately related human. beings. Following
Midgley's biosocial line of thinking, the narrative
history of each animal defines its identity. Since hogs
have been bred to playa certain role in our community,
our duties toward them derive from understanding what
their role naturally is.
Like Midgley, Callicott argues that the welfare ethic
of the mixed community enjoins us to leave wild or
"willed" animals alone, while caring humanely for
domestic species. This means that we are justified in
using domestic animals in the ways they have been bred
to be used. It is not inhumane to use a Belgian draft
horse to pull a wagon, as long as you do not abuse her
in the process. It is not inhumane to kill pigs and
chickens and steers for food as long as you care for
them in a way that does not violate the unspoken social
contract we have evolved between human and beast. 24
Well, reading environmental philosophy made me
wonder whetller my decision not to eat meat had been
divorced from narratives, history, and common sense,
in the worst way. If tlle history and social role of a being
plays a decisive role in determining what that thing is,
and if today's pigs would not be here if it were not for
the long history of human intervention in the mating
patterns of hogs, then the raising and slaughtering of
pigs is the very practice necessary for Durocs,
Hampshires, and Minnesota Number Twos to exist at
all. Who was I to condemn these creatures?
Callicott seemed to press the point on me. Those
who condemn meat-eating thereby condemn tlle "very
being" of the animals they are trying to defend. For
without the long historical practice of meat-eating,
Callicott writes, these particular animals would not
exist. My moral vegetarianism weakened.
Then I started thinking about the biosocial,
environmentalist claims. Do we condemn the very
being of something if we disapprove of the lifestyle
that being is forced to lead? Surely not. To condemn
the way something is treated is not to condemn that
thing. When we condemn slavery we do not thereby
condemn the existence of the slaves. Far from it. In the
interest ofthe good of the slave, we condemn the social
contract that has evolved to rationalize the restriction
of their freedom. Analogously, I came to see that I
could condemn the practice of domesticating and
slaughtering pigs without thereby condemning the
existence of these pigs.
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This principle "condones killing the attacker only if that
is the only way to protect the self." We must "choose
means that will do the least possible harm."27
The second principle is the principle of proportionality, and it deals with conflicts "between basic interests
[for example, food, water, and continued existence] of
animals/plants and nonbasic interests [for example, airconditioned offices] of humans."

us." The cases in question, then, are cases where the
principles of self-defense, proportionality, and
minimum wrong do not apply.
When the interests of parties are all basic ones
and there exists a natural source of good that can
be used for the benefit of any of the parties, each
party must be allotted an equal, or fair, share.32

Greater weight is to be given to basic than to
nonbasic interests, no matter what species,
human or other, the competing claims arise
from. Nonbasic interests are prohibited from
overriding basic interests. 28

The fifth principle is the principle ofrestitutive justice:

When harm is done to humans, animals, or
plants that are harmless, some form of
reparation or compensation is called for. The
greater the harm done, the greater the
reparation required. 33

This principle prohibits such practices as

Using these principles, I was able toanswermy two questions.
Consider the second question first. If I lived in a
place or a time where I could not survive without
hunting wild goats and sheep, or fishing for tuna and
whales, then it would be permissible for me to kill and
eat those animals. Why? Because the first principle
enjoins self-defense and, per hypothesis, the only way
to protect myself from death under the circumstances
of my thought experiment would be to eat meat or fish.
As long as I hunt and fish in a way that respects the
principles of fairness, minimum wrong, and proportionality, I will be justified in my carnivorous behavior.
There is, Taylor sagely points out, no principle requiring
me to sacrifice my life for the sake of animals.
Consider now my first question, whether raising and
slaughtering animals would not be permissible in the
ideal world, in the world where the number of humans
and farms is dramatically reduced. If there were, say,
only 500 million of us instead of 5 billion, and only
50,000 small farms instead of half a million corporate
farms, then other species might flourish. Under those
conditions, couldn't rational, autonomous persons who
have adopted the principle of respect for nature decide
to raise pigs in such a way that the animals were allowed
maximal freedoms and long unhurried lives? And
wouldn't it then be the case that those animals would
be better off living that lifestyle than never having the
opportunity to be born at all?
This question is more difficult, but it seems to me
we should answer it negatively. The principle of selfdefense could not be enjoined to sanction such activity,
because slaughtering the pigs in question, even toward

• Slaughtering elephants so the ivory of their tusks
can be used to carve items for the tourist trade.
• Killing rhinoceros so that their horns can be used
as dagger handles.
• Hunting and killing rare wild mammals, such as
leopards and jaguars, for the luxury fur trade.
• All sport hunting and recreational fishing. 29
The third principle is the principle of minimum
wrong. Like the second principle, it concerns conflicts
"between basic interests of animals/plants and nonbasic
interests of humans."
The actions of humans must be such that no
alternative ways ofachieving their ends would
produce fewer wrongs to wild living things. 3D
Plants and animals and humans have equal inherent worth,
in Taylor's estimation, but he recognizes that rational
people may decide to engage in activities involving harm
to wild living things. As long as these people are "raticnal,
informed, and autonomous persons who have adopted
the attitude ofrespect for nature," then "it is permissible
for them to pursue [their] values only so long as doing so
involves fewer wrongs (violations of duties) than any
alternative way of pursuing those values"31
Taylor's fourth principle is the principle of
distributive justice, and applies to "conflicts between
basic interests, in which nonhumans are not harming
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of controlling the instinct to eat flesh. Many former
meat-eaters have changed their habits, difficult as it may
have been to overcome the fear they would not find
anything sufficiently full of protein to eat at the next
meal. Second, if God really thought the Fall had so
weakened us that God had henceforth to permit certain
acts as a concession to our pitiful condition, wouldn't a
merciful God decide to permit something less violent
than bloodletting? How about allowing us not to respect
our parents occasionally, or not keeping every fourth
Sabbath, or gossiping during the cold month of
February? These would seem more reasonable
concessions to sin than allowing us to slit the throats of
billions of God's good animals.
The second argument for meat-eating follows on the
heels of Midgley's view that the domestication of
animals is a mutual covenant evolved between us and
animals. The idea here is that animals do not simply
serve us; we have a contract to provide them with food,
water, shelter, care, and comfortable lives. But what is
their responsibility? To pay us back with their lives.
The contract seems a bit one-sided. The argument would
make more sense if it was generally understood to mean
"Let the animals live in their natural social groupings,
provide them with conditions under which they can
pursue their interests, and let them live until a ripe old
age before backing up the truck." But that is not the
way the alleged covenant is generally understood. We
squeeze hogs together into pens not large enough for
them to establish their own area for defecating, we throw
them together into new social groupings every few
weeks, we control their reproductive cycles with
manufactured drugs, and we kill them before they are
six months old. If the tenus of the agreement were to
support hogs into comfortable retirement and then take
the carcasses of animals dying of natural causes for
sausage, the covenant argument would be more
persuasive. I suspect, however, that not many meat
consumers would sign it.
The third argument is that killing animals is
permissible as long as we take the minimal number,
and in a pious spirit. Native Americans kill the buffalo
with a tragic sense for the loss of its life, and tlley kill
only the number they need. They either eat or use the
entire animal, and they do all of this with a humble and
grateful spirit, demonstrating respect for the harmony
and balances of nature.
Isn't it permissible to kill and eat animals this way?
My response is Taylor's response: if it is a question of

the end of their lives, would not serve any basic interest
ofours; we can get our protein elsewhere. The principle
of proportionality also offers little support, because our
nonbasic interest in enjoying a good set of barbecued
back ribs is prohibited from overriding the pig's basic
interest in continued existence. The principle of
minimum wrong would also argue against even a low
level of meat-eating, since there are alternative ways
of achieving our interest in experiencing robust
gustatory pleasures.
Careful consideration of the natural relations of all
things and rigorous adoption of the attitude of respect
for nature inclines strongly toward moral vegetarianism.
And thus was I moved, against the historical practices
of my religious tradition and my personal convictions
about the virtues of family farms, to think some higher
mammals have mental lives roughly analogous to ours,
that killing them for food, even in a painless fashion,
does harm to them, and that I should stop having bacon
for breakfast. I then had to explain this to my
evangelical, Iowa farm-raised mother, who did her best
to feed her four children meat three times a day. I also
had to explain it to my Iowa farm relatives, Mennonite
dairy acquaintances, and Colorado ranch buddies, all
evangelical Christians, all outfitted with Bible verses
describing God's permission to eat meat in Genesis,
and Jesus' story of the prodigal son ending with the
killing of the fattened calf and-well, you fill in the
blank. I have, as I have admitted, no definitive response
to what I perceive as the most convincing interpretation
of what the biblical authors thought about this matter, and
I have conceded the Bible for the present. But I hasten
to add that I am not happy about this situation, because
the text has authority for me and my community, and I
am not prepared simply to abandon it.

6. Three Theological Arguments for Meat-Eating
In conclusion, I want to say something against three
theological arguments for meat-eating. The first is that
meat-eating is a concession to sin, and God granted us
permission to eat animals because of our fallen
condition. The idea here is that we could not reasonably
be expected to control our carnivorous instincts once
our taste buds had been debased and we had been
exposed to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.
So God no longer required truly moral behavior of US."34
This argument is not convincing, for two reasons.
First, we know from experience lhat humans are capable
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survival, if it comes down to the Native Americans'
life or the buffalo's life, then the principle of self-defense
will justify the killing. I do not know how many Native
Americans still fall into this category, but I am confident
few of my readers face such dire circumstances.

9In "Autonomy and the Value ofAnimal Life," TIle Monist
70 (January, 1987), Frey argues that "the way is open to
infanticide or the killing of severely handicapped newborns" because they are not autonomous beings. "Obviously,"
he concludes, "the way is also open to the killing of animals"
(p. 51). I respond to Frey's argument in "The Moral Irrelevance
of Autonomy," Between the Species 8 (Winter, 1992), pp. 1527.

I have tried to write concretely, telling you my story
about my particular religious pieties, and my evolving
attitude toward pigs. Philosophical considerations
moved me to give up meat, but the environmental and
theocentric perspective that warrants my view now is
different from the animal rights one with which I began.
My position is somewhat softer now, and does not
amount to an absolute proscription against the taking
of animal life. Yet, I regret to say, it offers little moral
support to those farmers struggling to hold onto their
land by raising animals to be led to slaughter.

10 James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric
Perspective, Vol. I. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
19841), p. 327, drawing on Romans 12: 1-2.
11 "All plants that bear seed everywhere on the earth, and
every tree bealing fruit which yields seed: they shall be yours
for food" (Gen. I :29, NEB). Quoted in Tom Regan,
"Christianity and Animal Rights: The Challenge and
Promise," Liberating Life (Orbis), p. 82.
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of Swine," in Hafez, ed. The Behaviour ofDomestic Animals
(Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1969), pp. 349-90.

32Taylor, p. 292.
33 Taylor, p. 304.

21 On this point, Klaus Immelman argues that it is very
difficult to say that a specific behavioral trait has been caused
by the process of domestication. Immelman writes: "the
development of many structural and physiological
characteristics also depends to a large degree on environmental
factors; the artificial conditions in which the animals live can
also lead to modifications that are superimposed on any possible
genetic changes." Klaus Immelman, Introduction to EtJwlogy,
tr. Erich Klingharnmer (New York: Plenum, 1980), p. 197. The
reason is that changes in behavior can result from the animals'
responses to environmental conditions. Such changes would
have to be considered modifications made by the animal itself,
not by human selection of specific genetic arrangements.

34 The rabbinic tradition contains such an argument in
Sanhedrin 59b: Rav Judah stated in the name of Rav, "Adam
was not permitted meat for purposes of eating as it is written
.... But when the sons of Noah came [God] permitted them
[to eat the beasts of the earth] .... "
David J. Bleich offers this restatement of the position:
... Primeval man was denied the flesh of animals
because of his enhanced moral status. Permission
to eat the flesh of animals was granted only to Noah
because, subsequent to Adam's sin, his banishment
from the Garden of Eden and the degeneration of
subsequent generations, man could no longer be
held to such lofty moral standards (p. 238).

22 Taylor refrains from saying food animals have a right
to life. At one point he seems to imply the history of
domestication has reduced food animals from the status of
beings deserving respect to the status of "machines, buildings,
tools, and other human artifacts" (p. 56). But he immediately
adds that we must treat them in ways that are good for them,
and "this is a matter that is quite independent of whatever
usefulness [they] might have to humans" (p. 57). He writes,
further, that "the question of how [domestic animals] ought
to be treated could not be decided simply by seeing what sort
of treatment of them most effectively brings about the human
benefit for which they are being used" (p. 57). Taylor's view
is not unambiguous, but this is because his primary concern
is with our duties toward wild living things and not with our
duties toward domesticated animals.

See "Animal Experimentation," (pp. 194-236) and
"Vegetarianism and Judaism," (pp. 237 -50), in Bleich,
Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol. 3 (New York: KTAV,
1989). Bleich does not agree with this interpretation of the
text: "In point of fact, this [Rav Judah's] talmudic dictum
is simply a terse statement of the relevant law prior to the
time of Noah but is silent with regard to any validating
rationale" (p. 238).
Bleich notes that Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook also
maintains that humans are unable in their fallen state to
overcome their desire for meat, and refers to Kook's article
in Hebrew "Afikim ba-Negev," Ha-Pales vol. 3, no. 12 (Elul
5663), p. 658.

231. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental
Ethics," in In Defense ofthe Land Ethic, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
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24 J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again," Between the Species 4
(Summer, 1988), p. 167.

Summer 1992

135

Between the Species

